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"Too Close for the Guns!" 
9 Canadian Infantry Brigade in the 
Battle for the Rhine Bridgehead 
Lee A. Windsor 
Tie spring of 1945 was the "sweetest of all s easons" for Dutch and C a n a d i a n 
participants in the Second World War. That April, 
First Canadian Army lifted the yoke of Nazi 
oppression once and for all from the people of 
the Netherlands. It was a month of rapid 
advances from the Rhine to the North Sea 
punctuated by sometimes bitter "mopping up" 
battles to clear isolated German garrisons from 
towns like Zutphen and Groningen. Despite 
suffering casualties until the last days of the war, 
many Canadian soldiers remember that spring 
of liberation fondly. 
In those first days of spring, however, the 
North Nova Scotia Highlanders experienced one 
of their most savage battles of the war. It left 68 
of them wounded and 44 dead after a single day 
of battle in the town of Bienen, Germany. These 
losses represented 30 per cent of the unit's 
fighting strength and would be considered 
devastating at any time during the war, but 
especially so given the end was in sight. German 
losses numbered over 200 dead, a similar 
number of prisoners, many of whom were 
wounded, and an unknown number of recovered 
casualties. Most wounds on both sides were 
inflicted by bullets and grenades.1 
The outcome of this battle contradicts the 
popular belief, initiated by American Lieutenant-
General George S. Patton Jr., that the German 
army on the east bank of the Rhine was beaten.2 
It also provides an example of vicious close-
quarter fighting, challenging the widely-held view 
that Anglo-Canadian citizen soldiers preferred 
to stick close to cover and let their overwhelming 
artillery and air power do the killing.3 The 
Canadians also discovered that their enemy did 
not consist of weary old men and young boys, 
but the latest, albeit last, crop of keen Nazi 
replacements prepared to die for their Fiihrer. 
The North Nova action at Bienen on 25 
March was the climax of 9 Canadian Infantry 
Brigade's role in Second Brit ish Army's 
Operation Plunder. Nine Brigade was attached 
to XXX British Corps during its assault crossing 
of the Rhine in support of the larger main landing 
near Wesel. It was the dramatic crossing at Wesel, 
preceded as it was by airborne and commando 
landings and followed by a climactic dash into 
the heart of Germany, that drew historians' 
attention. Military historians' fascination with 
rapid manouevre and sweeping advances 
obscures the fact that it was XXX Corps, and its 
attached Canadian brigade, that carried out the 
most difficult and important task of Operation 
Plunder. 
German Forces opposing XXX Corps 
consisted of the only cohesive army left on the 
western front, General Alfred Schlemm's First 
Parachute Army. Schlemm's frontline divisions 
were rested, reinforced, well dug-in, backed by 
150 pieces of artillery, and a powerful reserve 
in the form of XLVII Panzer Corps. This corps, 
consisting of the veteran 116th Panzer and 15th 
Panzer-Grenadier Divisions, was the last 
operational-level manouevre formation left on 
the German order of battle in the west. 
These forces could not stop Plunder. 
Nevertheless, they were strong enough to impede 
a breakout and delay plans to encircle the Ruhr, 
capture Berlin and end the war as soon as the 
spr ing flooding aba ted . 4 F ie ld-Marshal 
Montgomery was acutely aware that the division 
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of post-war Europe between the Soviet Union 
and the Western Allies would be decided by the 
positions of their armies on the day the war 
ended. He could also not help but be aware that 
every day the war dragged on, more Allied 
soldiers, concentration camp inmates, and 
European civilians would perish. Montgomery 
therefore deemed it essential that General 
Schlemm's forces not be allowed to delay the 
breakout to Berlin.5 
While ostensibly ordered to "advance" on the 
flank of the main assault, the real mission of 
XXX Corps and its attached Canadians was to 
cross the Rhine where the Germans expected it 
most, between Rees and Emmerich. There the 
corps was to plow into the bulk of First 
Parachute Army, force the commitment of XLVII 
Panzer Corps and destroy it in a battle of 
annihilation. Such action would allow the main 
portion of Second Army to drive on Berlin 
unimpeded. 
Destroying XLVII Corps meant prolonged 
periods of intense fighting between forces similar 
in size and combat power. It also meant 
considerable bloodshed and little to show for it 
in terms of ground gained. However, once the 
process was complete, especially after 9 
Canadian Brigade broke the back of the last 
2
Canadian Military History, Vol. 12 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol12/iss2/2
Stacey's paragraphs about Bienen reflect his 
judgement of the Canadian Army's performance 
evident throughout The Victory Campaign.8 
Stacey implies Canadian infantry alone were 
incapable of overcoming prepared defences 
manned by more skilful German troops. It was, 
in Stacey's view, only when Canadian infantry 
advanced as part of a massive mechanical 
juggernaut, and behind a curtain of artillery that 
they could move at all. More recently, Timothy 
Harrison Place suggested that slow Anglo-
Canadian progress throughout the war resulted 
from a fundamental lack of tactical training and 
knowledge among junior infantry and armour 
leaders. This shortcoming was, he argues, 
overcome by relying on artillery to win battles.9 
The story told by surviving veterans and the 
records of units in 9 Brigade paints a very 
different picture of the battle for Bienen. 
Contrary to the orthodox interpretation that 
Allied armies in the Second World War possessed 
decisive material and numerical superiority over 
German forces, Canadian units fighting in 
Bienen had no such advantage.10 In fact, the full-
strength, well-equipped and motivated German 
units defending the town outnumbered their 
attackers, and in addition possessed all the 
advantages inherent in defending a fortified 
village with flanks secured by water obstacles. 
51st Division Signals detachment south of Speldrop, 24 March 1945. Rees can be seen burning in the background. In 
the foreground lies a 154 Brigade Highlander killed earlier that day. 9 Brigade relieved the exhausted Scotsmen later that 
evening. The flat, featureless topography of the Bienen-Speldrop area is most evident. 
German formations around Bienen, advances 
into Holland and the German interior came 
swiftly.6 
Because it took time and cost lives, fighting 
in the north end of the bridgehead is downplayed 
in accounts of Plunder. Instead, the rapid, low-
cost advance further south caught the eyes of 
historians seeking to measure success by miles 
travelled. Indeed, some Rhine cross ing 
commentators suggest that XXX Corps' sluggish 
advance along the northern flank resulted from 
poor motivation among leading infantry units. 
For example, Canada's official army historian, 
C.P. Stacey, wrote that despite having plenty of 
artillery support as well as help from heavy 
mortars and medium machine guns, the North 
Nova Scotia Highlanders got hopelessly "pinned 
down" in front of Bienen. 
According to Stacey it was only after XXX 
Corps' famous commander, Brian Horrocks, 
visited the North Nova command post that the 
unit was inspired to get moving again. Even then, 
they needed help from Wasp flame-throwers, 
tanks and further artillery concentrations. Yet, 
with all that support, the North Novas still only 
gained a foothold at the edge of town. A second 
Canadian battalion was needed to clear the 
objective and move past it.7 
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From this village, and others like it in 9 Brigade's 
area, the enemy commanded the surrounding 
flat, featureless terrain with fire. Despite these 
odds Canadian infantrymen fought their way into 
town, killed large numbers of Germans and took 
many more prisoner. By doing so, 9 Brigade 
contributed significantly to the goal of breaking 
XLVII Corps' capacity to conduct mobile 
operations. 
Capturing real estate was of secondary 
importance in the Allied strategy and doctrine 
for defeating Germany. Indeed, the reason 
German units finally yielded ground in the Rees 
area was because they suffered crippling losses. 
Ultimately the Allied objective at Bienen, and 
perhaps most other Second World War battles, 
was to kill, capture or otherwise incapacitate 
members of the German Army.'' 
Undoubtedly, such goals were distasteful to 
politicians and voters at home, the soldiers 
ordered to achieve them, and even to historians 
writing years after the event, especially with 
Great War memories of bloody attrition so close 
at hand. Perhaps for this reason, Allied leaders 
deliberately or otherwise couched their gory 
objectives in more palatable terms. In the north 
end of the Rhine bridgehead, the term used to 
describe the mission of wiping out XLVII Corps 
was "flank protection." 
The Canadian portion of the Rhine crossing 
story began in March, when 9 Brigade was pulled 
out of the line to begin training and integrating 
reinforcements for the next offensive. Allied 
intelligence, together with the number of German 
corpses and burned out equipment lying 
between Nijmegen and the Rhine, convinced 
Montgomery that the German army could not 
defend behind the river in any depth. Indeed, 
the Allies succeeded in their goal of destroying 
most of the German Army on the western front 
before it could escape over the Rhine.12 They 
correctly believed that once the remaining forces 
defending the river were destroyed, Allied armies 
could unleash their own "blitzkrieg" and end the 
war rapidly.13 Montgomery's plan for Operation 
Plunder reflects this assumption. 
Field Marshal Montgomery took two weeks 
to build Second British Army into a massive 
amphibious landing and pursuit force organized 
to s torm the Rhine, es tab l i sh a secure 
bridgehead and then break out for the final race 
8 
to Berlin. Second Army's riverborne assault 
would be delivered by XXX British Corps on the 
left in the Rees area, and XII British Corps on 
the right, west of Wesel. In front of XII Corps 
two airborne divisions would drop on the high 
ground commanding the approaches to the river. 
Behind them stood the rested and refitted troops 
of British VIII Corps which would rapidly pour 
into the bridgehead once it was secure. It was 
planned that XII and VIII Corps would break out 
together and not stop until they reached the front 
steps of the Reich's Chancellery in Berlin. 
The orders given to XXX Corps' were to 
advance northeast protecting Second Army's 
flank. On the night of 23 March, 51 st Highland 
Division would assault across the Rhine. The 
following morning, 9 Canadian Brigade was to 
move into the bridgehead under 51st Division 
command and drive down river, seizing road and 
bridge sites so that First Canadian Army could 
advance into Holland.14 
Commanders of these formations knew that 
within hours of landing they would be hit with 
local counterattacks that were the hallmark of 
German defensive doctrine. They also planned 
to receive a major counterattack by XLVII Corps 
12 to 24 hours after landing. This counterattack 
was in fact more than planned for, it was hoped 
for. The reality of 1940s weapon technology 
meant that dug-in and concealed defenders held 
an advantage over attacking forces moving in the 
open. From 1943 onward, Allied doctrine and 
training manuals taught that the key to defeating 
the German Army was to capture defensible 
terrain which the enemy would be compelled to 
countera t tack . 1 5 When the infantry and 
armoured vehicles of XLVII Corps emerged from 
the safety of their fortified houses and dugouts, 
they would be destroyed by waiting Anglo-
Canadian troops. 
The problem with Second Army's plan was 
that even this late in the war, Allied numerical 
and material superiority only existed when parts 
of the front were thinned out to achieve 
concentration at a decisive point. Montgomery 
was able to concentrate overwhelming combat 
power in the Xanten-Wesel area by committing a 
much weaker XXX Corps against the main 
strength of First Parachute Army. Modern 
soldiers starkly refer to such endeavours as 
"economy of force" operations. 
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9 Brigade crossing River Rhine west of Rees, 24 March 1945. Even though 51st Division controlled the far bank, the 
Canadians were still subjected to mortar and shellfire. The HLI crossed by amphibious "Buffalo" armoured carriers, while 
the SDG and NNSH riflemen crossed by stormboat as seen here. Support weapons travelled by Buffalo or engineer 
ferry. 
On the night of 23 March, the "economy" 
XXX Corps began Operation Plunder. At first, 
51st Highland Division experienced little 
difficulty when they landed and began to expand 
the bridgehead. However, the German reaction 
was every bit as strong and somewhat swifter 
than expected. Within hours Schlemm's 
paratroopers came alive to fiercely contest 
Scottish attempts to secure Rees and expand the 
bridgehead. A few hours later XLVII Panzer 
Corps sallied out of its bivouac areas into the 
counterattack. 
The 15th Panzer Grenadier Division joined 
II Parachute Corps in a counterattack on the 
Highland bridgehead. The 115 Panzer Grenadier 
Regiment of 15th Division poured into the 
Bienen gap between the Rhine flood plain and 
Millinger Meer, joining two parachute regiments 
already fighting the Scots. The 104 Panzer 
Grenadier Regiment, joined 8th Parachute 
Division's counterattack south of Millinger Meer 
towards Rees.16 
The arrival of these German reinforcements 
tipped the balance of strength against 51st 
Highland Division and signalled the start of the 
German counteroffensive. Unfortunately, the 
Scottish bridgehead was not yet large enough to 
be effectively defended. Ferry and bridging sites 
near Rees were still under heavy shellfire from 
German artillery to the nor th and east , 
restricting the speed with which XXX Corps 
could build its combat power. To make matters 
worse, Millinger Meer is situated inside a great 
bend in the Rhine creating two bottlenecks of 
land which the Scots had to seize if the corps 
was to break out of the Rees pocket. Those two 
bottlenecks became plugged by three well-
equipped and fully-manned German divisions. 
At the same time 116th Panzer Division 
attempted to slip south towards what the 
Germans by then identified as the main assault 
at the Diersfordter Wald across from Xanten. 
In such circumstances 51st Highland 
Division could not shift to a defensive posture 
to grind up enemy counterattacks. Its very 
capacity to do so using large quantities of 
observed artillery fire was hampered by the 
narrowness of their bridgehead. Lack of depth 
and br idges m e a n t s u p p o r t i n g a r m s , 
ammunition and reserves were not present in 
sufficient quantity to kill Germans while keeping 
Allied costs low. There was also the matter of 
116th Panzer's effort to escape XXX Corps' 
containment task. Although it was increasingly 
outnumbered, 51st Division's mission was clear, 
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it must attack. After inflicting heavy losses on 
German counterattacking forces early on 24 
March, the Highland Division hurled itself at the 
line of fortified villages north of Rees. During 
this desperate fighting attack met counterattack 
and positions changed hands repeatedly.17 
According to the original plan once the 
ground at both ends of Millinger Meer was 
secure, 9 Canadian Brigade would pass through 
and at tack strong German forces in the 
Emmerich area. However, much of that enemy 
force had already marched to the sound of the 
guns to reinforce Bienen in the northern and 
more narrow of the two bottlenecks leading out 
of the Rees Pocket. Also, by midday on 24 March, 
51st Highland Division was reaching the point 
of exhaustion. The divisional commander, Major-
General Thomas Rennie, had expressed concern 
about the weakness of forces allotted to the Rees 
sector prior to Plunder. As if to confirm his 
apprehensions, a German mortar bomb killed 
him in his jeep after checking on the progress 
of his 152 Brigade in Rees.18 
More pressing than Rennie's death was the 
situation at the road junction village of Speldrop 
on 154 Brigade's front. The 1st Black Watch 
reached the town at dawn, but were driven out 
by regimental-sized German counterattacks 
which left two platoons cut off. Several attempts 
to reach the beleaguered platoons were stopped 
with heavy losses from German machine gun, 
mortar and artillery fire. After the third attempt, 
the Black Watch were spent. 
The other battalions in 154 Brigade, 7th 
Black Watch and 7th Argyll & Sutherland 
Highlanders, were in no position to help as they 
took on the better part of a German division near 
Reeserward and Bienen.19 The other two 
brigades of 51st Division were equally absorbed 
in a desperate fight to clear the southern 
bottleneck at Rees, forcing General Horrocks to 
commit the Canadians to help 154 Brigade. First 
into the fray were the Highland Light Infantry 
from Waterloo County, Ontario with orders to 
rescue the t rapped Scott ish pla toons in 
Speldrop.20 
The HLI, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel 
P.W. Strickland, received priority support from 
divisional field and corps medium artillery for 
their 1730 hours attack. However, as was the 
10 
case with every other fortified village attacked 
by Canadians since landing in Normandy, the 
unit first had to cross 1,000 yards of pancake-
flat, exposed terrain. Supporting artillery 
concentrations reduced, but did not entirely 
stop, German machine gun, anti-aircraft gun and 
mortar crews from cutt ing down several 
Canadians during the approach. Nevertheless, 
the two leading HLI companies skilfully and 
quickly crossed the open ground and broke into 
the village. 
Among those hit during the approach were 
all the platoon commanders in Major J.C. King's 
"B" Company, advancing on the northwest corner 
of the village. Lance-Sergeant C.J. Reidel picked 
up a Bren light machine gun, took command of 
the leading platoon, ordered them to fix 
bayonets, and charged an orchard strong-point 
dominating the company's line of advance. After 
the first ten of their number were killed, the 
remaining fifteen of the orchard's defenders 
surrendered. Several machine guns, 20 mm anti-
aircraft guns, and three 75 mm infantry guns 
were captured in the orchard. 
After Reidel's successful assault, Major King 
led the balance of the company into its objectives 
in Speldrop 's nor th end. However, they 
immediately came under intense fire from three 
German tanks as well as a number of machine 
guns and rocket launchers sited in a cluster of 
fortified buildings beyond the company's 
assigned objective. "B" Company's orders were 
to secure a firm base for a follow-on company 
to pass through. Apparently realizing that his 
base was not yet secure, Major King called for 
the battal ion's support weapons. Shortly 
thereafter, with a pair of Wasp flame-throwing 
vehicles, four 6-pounder anti-tank guns and two 
rifle platoons plastering the German positions, 
King's remaining platoon successfully stormed 
the fortified houses. For their "initiative" and 
"great personal courage" in securing the north 
end of Speldrop, L/Sgt. Reidel was awarded the 
Military Cross and Major King, the Distinguished 
Service Order. 
Similar drive was demonstrated in the 
southeast corner of the village by Lieutenant 
George MacDonald. MacDonald's 8 Platoon led 
"A" Company's assault on the HLI right flank. 
Under covering fire from a section of carrier 
platoon Bren guns, MacDonald's men sprinted 
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Soldiers for the HLI relax in the village of Speldrop after the battle has been won. 
into the house designated as their objective. Once 
inside the platoon was nearly obliterated by a 
half-dozen machine-guns in neighbouring 
houses and the fire of two German tanks. After 
every one of the platoon's non-commissioned 
officers were hit, MacDonald rallied the survivors 
and put down a strong base of rifle and Bren 
fire to cover an assault by the rest of "A" 
Company. MacDonald earned a Military Cross 
for his actions, although he died two days later. 
With the outer crust penetrated, "C" and "D" 
Companies passed through to press the assault 
home. The HLI War Diary described resistence 
inside Speldrop as "fanatical." By midnight the 
battalion still only held part of the town. German 
paratroops fiercely contested every house and 
often launched individual suicide attacks on 
advancing Canadians. Many of the defenders 
were burned out of their defences by Wasps. 
During the night-long street battle, the HLI also 
made much use of grenades and bayonets.21 The 
strength, firepower, and tenacity demonstrated 
by the Germans in Speldrop was merely a taste 
of what was to come. 
The S tormont , D u n d a s & Glengarry 
Highlanders from eastern Ontario were next to 
cross into the bridgehead at 1100 hours. They 
were followed by Brigadier R.M "Rocky" 
Rockingham's headquarters at 1345 hours and 
the North Nova Scotia Highlanders at 1600 
hours. General Horrocks limited Rockingham's 
ability to coordinate his brigade's deployment 
by ordering the Canadian battalions into the 
battle piecemeal to relieve 154 Brigade. 
Coordination was further jeopardized by the 
pressing need to get ferry and bridging sites out 
of artillery range. Rockingham experienced this 
necessi ty f i rs t-hand when his a rmoured 
command car rolled off a ferry straight into an 
accurate German shell concentration on the river 
bank. Remarkably, no one was injured. Despite 
these pressures, Rockingham's staff made plans 
to formally relieve 154 Brigade at last light and 
to take control of the battle in the north 
bottleneck. 
In the afternoon of 24 March the SDGs, or 
"Glens" as they were known, received orders to 
relieve 7th Black Watch on the far left flank. That 
unit fought off counterattacks all day and was 
unable to press beyond the collection of farms 
known as Reeserward. The 7th Argylls faced 
similar problems in front of Bienen. At great cost 
11 
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Brigadier J.M. Rockingham, who was awarded the bar to the Distinguished Service Order for his actions in the Rhine 
bridgehead, confers with officers of the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade and the Royal Canadian Engineers, XX March 
1945. 
the Argylls fought their way into a farm 150 yards 
from the edge of town, but all attempts to move 
beyond it were stopped. They were to be relieved 
as soon as possible by the North Nova Scotia 
Highlanders. However, the Glens and the North 
Novas were still crossing the Rhine when the new 
orders were issued.2 2 They would not be 
available to effect the relief until well after dark. 
Movement efforts were further hampered by 
incessant heavy German shelling. 
The arrival of two fresh Canadian battalions 
did not significantly alter the force ratio on this 
flank which still heavily favoured the enemy. 
German 16 and 24 Parachute Regiments, 115 
Panzer Grenadier Regiment and bits and pieces 
of other units almost the equivalent of a fourth 
regiment occupied this narrow corridor. Each 
German battalion fielded 500 to 600 combatants 
and was liberally equipped with 40 machine 
guns and ten 81 mm mortars each when they 
began the battle that morning. In support the 
Germans could also call on a platoon of assault 
guns and a battery of six heavy 120 mm mortars 
in Bienen as well as field artillery batteries near 
Millingen. These forces doubtlessly suffered 
losses during the intense fighting on 24 March, 
but at sunset they still controlled the narrow 
12 
bottleneck with most of their heavy weapons 
intact.23 
As the HLI discovered in Speldrop, terrain 
conditions magnified the enemy's force ratio 
advantage. In the flat, featureless topography 
found throughout 9 Brigade's area, villages were 
the decisive high ground. From the many two, 
and sometimes three story stone houses found 
in those villages, German infantry and artillery 
fire controllers easily observed and dominated 
the ground around them for thousands of yards. 
Furthermore, the level countryside enabled the 
numerous German machine guns to fire at 
extreme ranges of up to 1,500 yards, maximizing 
their effectiveness while limiting the ability of 
Canadian artillery observers to locate and engage 
them. 
The Germans defending those villages were 
extremely well-motivated considering their 
homeland was collapsing all around them. First 
Parachute Army received Germany's last fresh 
draft of replacements several weeks before the 
battle. These were not old men, but teenagers 
newly-turned 17 or 18, most with Hitler Youth 
exposure to military training and Nazi ideology. 
They fleshed out divisions broken in the late 
8
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winter fighting, but which still possessed a strong 
core of trained and experienced officers and 
NCOs who promptly whipped the new recruits 
into shape.24 
Brigadier Rockingham planned to advance 
into the bottleneck with two battalions abreast 
on the morning of 25 March. The Glens would 
advance on the left starting from the last position 
of 7th Black Watch on the bend in the road at 
Reeserward. They were to attack 2,500 yards 
nor thwards to a series of points beyond 
Grietherbusch and in line with Bienen. In the 
centre, the North Novas were to advance into 
Bienen using the farm, held by the 7th Argylls, 
as their startline. The ground on the right near 
Androp would not be attacked because, for the 
moment, two battalions were all that could be 
spared. When the plan was conceived the HLI 
were still engaged at Speldrop. During the night 
of 2 4 / 2 5 March the North Shore (New 
Brunswick) Regiment from 8 Brigade crossed 
into the bridgehead under Rockingham's 
command, but it would be after sun-up before 
they would be in a position to assist. 
With Horrocks pressuring the brigade to get 
the crossing sites out of artillery range, there 
was no time to waste waiting for luxuries like 
reserves or r e c o n n a i s s a n c e . The bes t 
Rockingham could hope for was that the HLI 
and the North Shores would be available later 
on the 25th to breakout of the "bottleneck" after 
enemy forces defending the Bienen "cork" were 
destroyed. To support their attack, the Glens 
and North Novas would have their own heavy 
weapons, plus additional medium machine gun 
and 4.2-inch mortar detachments from the 
Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, as well as 
towed and self-propelled anti-tank guns from 
94th Battery, 3rd Canadian Anti-Tank Regiment. 
A single troop of British duplex-drive Sherman 
tanks of the Essex Yeomanry would accompany 
the North Novas. Indirect artillery support would 
come from the 25-pounders of 14th Field 
Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery. 
The Glens' unloaded and assembled first, 
as they had farther to travel to reach their 
HLI Jeep Ambulance in Speldrop 24 March 1945. These 
nimble vehicles allowed the rapid evacuation of 
wounded soldiers and saved many lives throughout the 
battle. Also note the brick houses. All houses 
encountered in the Rees-Bienen area were made of 
concrete, brick or stone, providing strong protection to 
German defenders. 
objective. Their attack would start at 0640 hours 
on the 25th. The North Nova Scotia Highlanders, 
only briefed at 0530 hours that same morning, 
were to march to their "Argyll Farm" startline at 
0700 hours.25 At 0900 hours the North Nova's 
artillery fire plan would commence shooting 
them across the short distance into town for 
what was expected to be a tough house-to-house 
fight. The North Nova commanding officer, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Don Forbes, knew about the 
size of the garrison in Bienen and was under no 
illusions about his unit's difficult task.26 
At 0630 hours a salvo of British rockets fired 
from the west bank of the river was to pave the 
way for the Glens. When the rockets had not 
appeared by 0640 hours, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Gemmel, commanding the Glens, called them 
off and ordered "D" Company to attack on 
schedule. The ground around their objective was 
extremely sodden. Their area was essentially a 
marshy island on the water side of the main 
winter dyke built to hold the spring flood. Days 
before, the area was almost completely 
underwater. The warm March sunshine was 
drying the ground fast on the eastward side of 
the dyke in Bienen, but on the approach to 
Grietherbusch, mud limited movement to the 
raised main road into the village and the farms 
alongside it. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Gemmel had little choice 
but to leapfrog his companies along this narrow 
9
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Canadian Operations in the Rhine Bridgehead 
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frontage securing each of the farm complexes in 
turn. By 0715 hours "D" Company secured Kivitt 
Farm. After working forward carefully and 
winkling out two German pr isoners , "C" 
Company reported Schultenhof Farm clear at 
0800 hours . About this time the German 
defenders made their presence felt by shelling 
Schultenhof Farm and its approaches just as "B" 
company moved up to take the lead. No one was 
injured in the barrage, although shell fragments 
perforated one of the company's PIAT anti-tank 
weapons. 
When Major Peterson's "B" Company 
resumed their advance beyond Schultenhof 
Farm sometime between 0800 hours and 0900 
hours , German sappers of 15th Panzer-
Grenadier Division's Engineer Battalion came to 
life. The German engineers easily dominated the 
narrow raised road area with machine gun fire. 
All attempts by "B" Company to manoeuvre were 
checked. At 0900 hours Gemmel learned that 
Peterson was wounded and that the advance had 
stalled.27 
First Attempt at Bienen 
M eanwhile , the North Nova Scotia Highlanders moved forward on schedule 
at 0700 hours. At 0745 hours, Lieutenant-
Colonel Forbes es tab l i shed his tact ical 
headquarters near a great windmill at Rosau 
Farm. The battalion's 3-inch mortar platoon and 
attached Cameron heavy mortars set up behind 
the farm while the rifle companies formed up to 
advance. Major Don Learment's "A" Company 
would take the lead, followed by Captain Jack 
Fairweather's "B" Company. 
At 0815 hours the lead companies set off in 
single file along the west side of the dyke. 
Compared with the flat ground around Bienen, 
this ten-foot high dyke was a significant terrain 
feature which shielded the battalion's right flank. 
The North Novas hoped the Glens could protect 
their left. They hoped too that their "Argyll Farm" 
startline was secure. With so much pressure to 
push on there had been no time to confirm either 
of these matters. 
When the ripping sound of German MG 42 
machine guns began, Learment's lead platoon 
Lieutenant-Colonel D.F. Forbes, DSO, Commanding 
Officer of the North Nova Scotia Highlanders. 
was scrambling over the intersection of the dyke 
and the road to Grietherbusch, a few hundred 
yards short of Argyll Farm. Bullets lashed at their 
exposed flank and knocked down several men 
in 7 Platoon. The fire that stopped the SDGs 
came from the same place and began around 
the same time the North Novas reached the level 
road crossing. 
Major Learment's immediate reaction was 
to rush his men over the dyke to escape the 
withering fire, but when they reached the crest 
they met equally strong machine gun and sniper 
fire from the south and east. On top of the dyke 
the company found a partially completed trench 
and bunker system running dozens of yards in 
both directions. Learment's men dropped into 
it just as German mortar bombs began to rain 
down. 
Behind "A" Company, Jack Fairweather's 
men faired little better. When the firing started 
only their lead platoon was pinned, thankfully 
with no one hit. Fairweather had his men dig in 
against the bank while the forward artillery 
observers laid on a fire mission. A quickly-
planned smoke and high explosive artillery 
barrage was to cover both companies as they 
bolted over the dyke and into the farm. Everyone 
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involved still fully intended to be at the startline 
for H-hour at 0900 hours. 
When the 25-pounders of 14th Field opened 
fire, "A" Company leapt out of the long trench 
and ran like the devil for the protection of Argyll 
Farm now plainly in sight dozens of yards away.28 
Several hundred yards behind, in "B" Company's 
positions, word of the hasty plan failed to reach 
10 Platoon and part of 12 Platoon. When the 
shelling started only half of the company 
crossed. On the other side they faced intense 
machine gun fire from Androp as well as a 
German counter-barrage of mortars and artillery. 
Those who did cross promptly dove into 
whatever cover they could find. 
Androp, situated on the edge of Millinger 
Meer, was defended by 24 Parachute Regiment 
manning dug-in machine gun emplacements.29 
Those positions lay 1,000 to 1,500 metres east 
of Argyll Farm and were thus able to put long 
range machine gun fire onto any movement in 
that area. However, Androp was not the greatest 
concern facing the lead North Nova companies. 
When "A" Company reached Argyll Farm they 
found their startline anything but secure. 
Remnants of an exhausted 7th Argyll company 
were clinging to some of the houses in the 
complex but the others were lost during a strong 
German counterattack just before dawn. As 
H-Hour fast approached, the Novas found 
themselves fighting to secure the startline. 
The Nova Scotians had to clear the farm fast 
if they were to meet their 0900 hours timing. 
Lieutenant Bob Hart 's 7 Platoon, already 
weakened from its experience at the dyke-road 
crossing, rose to the occasion. Hart personally 
charged into one house and came under fire from 
a position to its left. One of Hart's Bren gunners, 
Private P.A. Sidney spotted the Germans firing 
on his platoon leader and ran toward them 
blazing away with his Bren gun to keep their 
heads down. Upon reaching his prey he loudly 
demanded their surrender at which point 19 
dumbfounded German paratroopers filed back 
towards battalion headquarters with their hands 
in the air.30 
At 0845 hours 14th Field Regiment began 
lobbing smoke and high explosive shells on the 
south edge of Bienen. "A" Company formed up 
to assault on the right but B' Company was 
still pinned down further back. Forbes asked 
Fairweather by radio if his company could close 
the distance to the startline under the pre-H-
Hour smokescreen. Fairweather, under intense 
fire and still unaware that half his men were on 
the other side of the dyke, responded that he 
could. Unfortunately, the Canadian barrage only 
"dampened" the machine gun fire from Bienen 
and did nothing to suppress the fire from 
Androp. When Fairweather's men hustled to the 
farm some were picked off, others went to 
ground under the incessant machine gun fire. 
By the time they made it to the startline the 
company was only 26 strong, and its ordeal was 
just beginning. 
The two companies emerged from the 
relative safety of Argyll Farm into a killing zone. 
Bienen was defended by elements of 115 Panzer 
Grenadier Regiment, 16 Parachute Regiment, 
and a company from 18 Parachute Regiment. 
Although probably reduced in strength, these 
units possessed dozens of machine guns and 
most certainly outnumbered and outgunned the 
two understrength North Nova companies which 
barely mustered 85 men each when the battle 
began.31 
Fairweather's company barely passed the 
farm when two German self-propelled guns at 
the edge of town began hurling high explosive 
shells at them. Of the three Essex tanks that 
made their way to the farm, one bogged in soft 
ground, another was holed by a German self-
propel led gun and the th i rd wi thdrew. 
Fairweather saw it was utter madness to press 
on in these conditions. He reported to Forbes at 
0905 hours that he was barely beyond the 
startline, out of contact with two platoons, 
pinned down, and losing men. With "B" Company 
absorbing most of the German fire, "A" Company 
advanced somewhat further before they were 
stopped by the maelstrom of flying metal. 
Learment too could see the attack was futile until 
a new fire plan could be arranged, but his order 
to withdraw to the farm failed to reach 8 Platoon 
which was almost at the forward German 
trenches.32 
The first attack stalled, but not in the way 
that C.P. Stacey's Official History suggests. The 
dogged determination of the two lead companies 
to launch their attack as planned, despite 
16 
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impossible odds and without time to properly 
plan and reconnoitre, implies a high level of 
combat motivation among all ranks. Then, 
rather than sit idle or withdraw to safer ground 
when the attack stopped, platoon and company 
commanders demonstrated tactical skill and 
professionalism by collecting and positioning 
heavy weapons and ammunition. With great 
difficulty and under a huge weight of fire, the 
North Novas transformed Argyll Farm into a 
secure, if highly dangerous, firebase and jump-
off point for further action. 
What made the situation so difficult was the 
proximity of Argyll Farm to Bienen. The main 
German positions were close enough to pour 
accurate fire into the farm complex as well as 
anyone venturing north. These machine gun 
positions were located in strong stone, brick, 
and concrete houses and reinforced with 
overhead protec t ion . They were near ly 
impervious to all but direct hits by medium or 
heavy shells. Unfortunately, there was not 
enough medium artillery to go around during 
Plunder. On 25 March, the few medium 
regiments spared for XXX Corps' economy role 
were busy supporting 51st Highland Division in 
the Rees bottleneck and in long-range air-
observed shoots on columns of 116th Panzer 
Division as it attempted to move southward. The 
North Nova Scotia Highlanders had to rely on 
the 25-pounders of 14th Field that day, and even 
those had a limited number of shells to commit 
to the Canadian battle.33 
The short distance between the startline and 
the farm also made it difficult for artillery 
observers or mortar fire controllers to put their 
heads up long enough to adjust the fire on the 
multitude of muzzle blasts coming from the 
front. With wounded Canadians lying at the edge 
of town, absolute precision was all the more 
necessary. The fighting was now too close for 
the guns to provide real suppression of the 
German line. Any Canadian soldier present near 
Bienen would also take great exception to 
suggestions that German industry was no longer 
able to adequately supply the Nazi war machine. 
Throughout the fighting German defenders were 
never short of small-arms, mortar, or artillery 
ammunition.34 
After the first assault halted Lieutenant-
Colonel Forbes organized a new fireplan and a 
new attack by "A" and "B" Companies. At 0920 
hours he ordered Captain Fairweather and Major 
Learment to reorganize their sub-units for 
another attempt to break into the first row of 
houses. Forbes continued to hold back "C" and 
"D" Companies so they would be fresh for the 
next phase. Brigade's last orders were to destroy 
the defenders in Bienen and move beyond the 
town. Forbes could not count on help any time 
soon and would therefore need at least two full 
companies for the expected house-to-house 
battle in town. 
Perhaps Lieutenant-Colonel Forbes felt the 
two lead companies would have a better chance 
9 Brigade Headquarters near Esserden, Germany 25 March 1945. Brigadier R.M. Rockingham stands in the centre with 
his back to the house. The concrete block construction of the house was typical of structures in the area, making each 
one a strong-point. 
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making those few short yards to the town now 
that the startline was firmly in Canadian hands. 
The task would also be made easier by putting 
down a smoke and high explosive artillery 
concentration on Androp during the assault. It 
was up to Fairweather and Learment to 
reorganize and report back to Forbes when their 
companies were ready to go. That report never 
arrived. 
The six platoons of North Nova rifleman 
scattered in and around Argyll Farm now had 
the full attention of every weapon the Germans 
could bring to bear. Artillery, mortars and 
machine guns targeted any attempt to move 
outside the protection of the farm or even on its 
front edge. Counter-battery efforts were non-
existent as the guns and aircraft normally used 
for such missions were focussed on the main 
assault by XII Corps and the airborne forces. 
The North Nova anti-tank platoon made 
several valiant attempts to position their guns 
at the forward edge of Argyll Farm to provide 
direct gunfire support, but the movement of the 
towed 6-pounder anti-tank guns and their 
tracked carriers only increased the intensity of 
enemy fire. The platoon was unable to get a single 
gun into action.35 The bottom line was, with the 
inadequate firepower available to them in this 
close-in shootout, the North Novas could not win 
the firefight. 
Two "A" Company attempts to rescue 8 
Platoon under cover of 25-pounder smoke met 
with failure and more dead and wounded men. 
In the end, only the platoon leader and one other 
man made it back to the farm, both wounded. 
Likewise, attempts to assemble "B" Company 
met with limited success. Both companies lost 
a platoon commander and several NCOs, 
contributing to a further breakdown in control. 
By mid-morning, Fairweather still only mustered 
30 men from three platoons, although between 
them they possessed all company heavy weapons 
including Brens, two-inch mortars, and PIATs. 
These would soon come in handy. 
At 1030 hours Fairweather and Learment 
were still attempting to assemble isolated 
platoons under the noses of enemy machine guns 
firing at ranges which made it difficult to miss. 
When Brigadier Rockingham came forward to 
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Forbes ' HQ at 1145 hou r s , "A" and "B" 
Companies were still scattered and pinned by 
fire described in the usually stoic war diary 
language as "murderous." Forbes proposed to 
his Brigadier that the unit start "from scratch" 
with a new attack by his two fresh companies. 
Rockingham agreed and while he had no 
additional infantry battalion to offer as yet, he 
was able to direct a flight of Typhoons on 
Millingen in the direction of the hostile artillery. 
He also scrounged up another troop of Shermans 
from the British 4/7th Dragoon Guards.36 
The Glens in Grietherbusch 
More importantly, the Brigadier provided some badly needed coordination with the 
Glens in Grietherbusch. The new North Nova 
attack would not be made until 1430 hours. In 
the meantime, 14th Field Regiment turned its 
attention to destroying machine gun posts 
blocking Lieutenant-Colonel Gemmel's advance. 
The narrow dry axis of advance now hindered 
the Germans as much as it did the Glens that 
morning , for i t enabled accu ra t e and 
concentrated shooting by the Canadian guns. 
Captain John Dure's "D" Company took over 
the lead for the push into Grietherbusch. As had 
been the case in Speldrop the day before, even 
the most accurate artillery could only suppress 
German machine gun and mortar fire during the 
approach. When the shell concentrations lifted 
as the distance to the objective closed, the Glens 
still had to fight their way into German-held 
trenches and houses with section and platoon 
leaders making the most of their tactical skills. 
The lifting Canadian barrage brought a 
renewal of German machine gun and mortar fire 
which forced Dure's leading platoon to ground. 
Leaving his pinned platoon on the main road as 
a fire base, Captain Dure led the remainder of 
"D" Company in a "text-book" left flanking attack. 
In the face of intense fire from his front and from 
the north, Dure's men smashed their way into 
the German engineer battalion's position, killing 
14 and c a p t u r i n g 22 more. By noon, 
Gr ie the rbusch was in Canad ian h a n d s . 
Lieutenant-Colonel Forbes' left flank was now 
secure enough to get on with the job of clearing 
Bienen.37 
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The Clearing of Bienen 
Unlike the first attack, the new North Nova assault was planned in detail taking into 
consideration valuable intelligence paid for that 
morning with "A" and "B" Companies' blood. It 
was now appreciated that the strength of German 
defences along the south edge of town and the 
presence of wounded North Novas lying in the 
grass in front of them, made it impossible to 
suppress enemy machine guns. Instead, 14th 
Field would focus on suspected mortar positions 
inside and behind the town, and on providing 
smoke to conceal the Canadian advance. 
Typhoons would take on heavier gun positions 
near Millingen. 
The right flank at Androp would be 
neutralized by North Nova 3-inch mortars 
combined with Cameron Vickers machine guns 
and heavy 4.2-inch mortars firing smoke and 
high explosive bombs. Direct fire support would 
come from Argyll Farm, where at H-Hour, 
Fairweather and Learment would have what was 
left of their companies open up on Bienen with 
everything they had. The two surviving Essex 
tanks would move up to add their 75 mm guns 
and machine guns to the firebase. It was also 
hoped this renewed attempt to win the firefight 
in front of Bienen would convince the Germans 
that another frontal assault was about to go in. 
In fact, Forbes had other ideas. 
Forbes' plan was to take advantage of his 
secure left and the winter dyke by moving Major 
Dave Dickson's "D" Company to the west edge 
of town by slipping it up the left side of the dyke 
in the minutes before H-Hour. Major Lloyd 
Winhold's "C" Company would form up behind 
Argyll Farm. At H-Hour Winhold's men would 
a t t ack para l le l to and s o u t h of the 
Grietherbusch-Bienen road, towards the main 
intersection at the southeast corner of town. This 
move required the company to cross 500 yards 
of flat open terrain, but Forbes banked on the 
Germans expecting another frontal attack and 
not a dangerous sweep to the south. If the smoke 
screen was thick enough, "C" Company might 
Bienen - Disposit ions for the 1 4 3 0 hours NNSH attack on modern air photo 
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Lieutenant-Colonel Forbes 
briefed Majors Dickson and 
Winhold, together with the 
supporting arms commanders, at 
1300 hours. Also present was 
General Horrocks who impressed 
on those present the need to 
deliver the attack quickly and to 
"succeed at all costs," in order to 
put an end to German shelling of 
the Corps rear areas and bridging sites. One can 
only guess what was running through Forbes' 
mind listening to this pep talk after four hours 
of trying, without heavy guns, to bash through 
an enemy with at least twice his firepower sitting 
comfortably in concre te and s tone 
emplacements. 
With great haste Dickson and Winhold 
prepared their companies for the assault. Both 
moved up the west side of the dyke from 
Battalion HQ at Rosau towards Argyll Farm. This 
time, with the Glens controlling the left, the ten-
foot high dyke provided a greater measure of 
concealment and protection. Fifteen minutes 
before H-Hour at 1430 hours the mortars, under 
North Nova Mortar Platoon leader Captain 
Webber, started hitting Androp while 14th Field 
smoked off the front of town and pounded the 
centre and rear with high explosive. "A" and "B" 
Companies and the Essex Shermans added 
Bren, rifle, 2-inch mortar, .30-inch Browning and 
75 mm fire to the front of town, soliciting the 
expected vicious German response. 
Under this covering fire, Winhold's "C" 
Company hurried across the dyke level-crossing 
and in behind Argyll Farm where they proceeded 
to form up with the Dragoon Guards tanks and 
Wasps. Dickson's men continued along the west 
side of the dyke in single file. Lieutenant G.L. 
Monkley's 17 Platoon led, followed by Lieutenant 
Ron Boyce's 18 Platoon, company headquarters 
and Lieutenant Donald Pearce's 16 Platoon, 
making its way all the way up to a culvert under 
the dyke. 
Major D.M. Dickson and his wife Lorna in 
England before D-Day, May 1944. 
At H-Hour two pla toons , 
mus te r ing j u s t over 50 men 
between them, would rush over 
the dyke into the first line of 
houses backing onto it. Monkley's 
platoon on the left would take the 
houses near a small pathway 
leading down the dyke into town. 
Pearce's platoon on the right was 
to dash across a short open 
stretch into buildings closer to the 
front edge of town. After allowing 
a few minutes to secure those 
houses, Boyce's platoon, Dickson's 
headquarters group and the FOO 
party would follow them over to consolidate the 
houses and organize an advance into town. 
At the suggestion of Company Sergeant-Major 
Harry Bishop, Dickson designated a small "left 
out of battle" (LOB) party of approximately 15 
men to stay on the safe side of the dyke. The 
group was made up of men the CSM observed 
were not fully recovered from battle exhaustion 
after the bitter fighting in the Rhineland 
campaign and some of the battalion's first batch 
of conscripted replacements or "Zombies." The 
latter spent the previous two weeks training and 
integrating themselves into the unit, but Bishop 
was still reluctant to give them their first taste 
of battle in such a difficult action. The other 
conventional purposes served by LOB parties 
were to provide a reserve force or a core of men 
around which to rebuild the company should it 
be destroyed. 
Tragically, CSM Bishop's foresight proved 
necessary. The Germans in Bienen were unable 
to fire on the Novas as they assembled behind 
the dyke, but their positions further north 
alerted them to the threat. At 1430 hours "D" 
Company charged over the top into a boiling hell. 
Pearce's platoon melted. Ten of the small band 
of 25 men were struck by bullets before they 
were off the dyke. The remainder dove into a 
shallow depression in the ground just beyond 
the base of the dyke. 
The depression offered scant protection. One 
man after another was hit by bullets or blown 
apart with grenades hurled from German 
trenches only a few feet to the front and by 
machine guns in a large three-story fortified 
20 
just make it into the houses at the 
intersection before the Germans 
smelled a threa t . The 4 / 7 t h 
Dragoons Shermans and Carrier 
Platoon's Wasps would accompany 
Windhold 's men in in t imate 
support.38 
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house a several dozen yards away. Pearce's Bren 
gunners took aim and died with their shoulders 
to their weapons. Bedlam reached a climax when 
the Germans began firing Panzerfaust anti-tank 
rockets into 16 Platoon at point-blank range. 
This put Private G.P. Cameron over the edge. He 
stood up calmly, removed two No.36 grenades 
from his webbing and walked towards the 
German trench. The astonished Germans failed 
to cut him down as he calmly walked forward 
and dropped the grenades into the trench before 
turning around. The blast killed four Panzer-
Grenadiers and wounded three others. Cameron 
was shot in the back as he returned to the 
depression filled with 16 Platoon dead and dying. 
Monkley's platoon also lost men as it 
stormed over the dyke into a crossfire of machine 
guns, but they had less ground to cover and were 
out of the line of sight of the huge fortress house. 
They managed to kick their way into the houses 
with grenades, sten gun bursts, and bayonets 
killing most of the occupants except 11 who 
surrendered. A further 90 Germans spilled out 
of neighbouring houses with their hands held 
high. 
On the other side of the dyke, Major Dickson 
waited impatiently for his artillery FOO. The 
FOO's radio operator arrived, but the gunner 
officer was nowhere to be found. When the time 
came for the second wave to cross the dyke, 
Dickson sent Boyce's 18 Platoon on alone. He 
would follow as soon as the FOO arrived. 
Dickson felt that to go without him would be 
foolhardy as the company would need close 
artillery support to complete its mission of 
advancing deeper into town and of destroying 
the inevitable counterattacks. 
Boyce's platoon clambered over the dyke to 
assist Monkley at the houses near the footpath. 
The German defenders, awakened to the 
potential collapse of their right flank, poured 
everything they had onto the "D" Company 
toehold. Vast numbers of machine guns 
combined with a mortar barrage acted like a 
wrecking-crew on the houses occupied by the 
company, shredding shingles and boards, 
grinding bricks to dust, and hitting more North 
Novas. 
On the right only Pearce and four others from 
16 Platoon could still move. Pearce ordered them 
to make a break for the dyke after Private 
Cameron's sacrifice lessened the volume of fire 
pounding them. When they got up to run, three 
more were mowed down. Only Pearce and one 
other man made it back. Boyce also returned to 
the west bank of the dyke to report that 17 and 
18 Platoons had suffered heavy losses and were 
holding on by their fingernails. In the few 
minutes since H-Hour, almost half the company 
was killed or wounded. The situation was 
especial ly despe ra t e after 16 Platoon 
disintegrated on the right and the full attention 
of the fortress house turned to the remainder of 
the company. 
Rather than wait any longer for the FOO, 
Dickson played the only card he had. He ordered 
the LOB party to follow him over the dyke to 
reinforce the company position. The artillery 
radio operator, Bombardier Robert Muir, was 
to lead the FOO over as soon as he arrived. 
Pearce would also stay behind. Having his entire 
platoon wiped out before his eyes, he could fight 
no longer. No one could begrudge him the rest. 
Dickson and Boyce gathered the group at the 
foot of the dyke. With Dickson in the lead they 
then charged into the battle. As the company 
commander reached the top of the dyke, he 
paused to urge his troops on. As he did so he 
was struck in the abdomen by a bullet which 
passed through his body, throwing him to the 
ground. As Boyce and others following closely 
behind stopped to check on their leader, Dickson 
quietly urged them to keep moving on. Boyce 
then led the reinforcements into the main "D" 
Company position and took vengeance on the 
sniper. 
Dickson customari ly carried his pipe 
tobacco can inside his battledress jacket. The 
bullet which struck him first passed through the 
tin, possibly deflecting it enough to avoid hitting 
his spine as it exited through a gaping hole in 
his back. Nonetheless, as he lay on top of the 
dyke with bullets and mortar bombs landing all 
around him he prepared, with waning strength, 
for the end. One of Monkley's sect ion 
commanders, Sergeant Edison Smith ran back 
over the dyke to contact the tanks and Wasps 
back at the Argyll Farm firebase. A mortar bomb 
exploded as he reached the top of the dyke 
heaving his broken body on top of Dickson and 
then down the slope. 
21 
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With life fast pouring from his wound 
Dickson pulled out a picture of his wife and 
family. The movement was spotted by the sharp 
eye of Bombardier Muir, the artillery signaller, 
still waiting for the FOO. The sturdy gunner 
scrambled up the dyke to drag the giant 6'3" 
major down the side and out of harm's way. 
There Muir turned him over to two North Novas 
who had both suffered arm wounds. Together 
they half-carried, half-dragged Dickson's limp 
body several hundred yards till they met Private 
Daniel Shank's jeep ambulance. Lieutenant-
Colonel Forbes stopped the jeep as it passed 
battalion headquarters to question Dickson on 
the status of his company. In his half-conscious 
state, the young major was only able to respond 
that his men had "done their best against the 
bastards." At the time, neither officer could fully 
comprehend what "D" Company's actions had 
accomplished.39 
At this drama played out along the dyke, 
Lloyd Winhold's "C" Company made its way 
towards the main intersection at the southeast 
corner of town. This axis required a much longer 
and exposed approach march t h a n "D" 
Company's, but everyone hoped the circuitous 
route would avoid the pre-registered kill zones 
that prevented all attempts by the 7th Argylls 
and then "A" and "B" companies to get into the 
front edge of town. This ground also better lent 
itself to the employment of the armoured 
vehicles. 
The rifle platoons moved off in arrowhead 
formation at 25-yard intervals with Lieutenant 
Bill Myers' 15 Platoon in the lead, followed by 
Lieutenant Roper's 13 Platoon, and Winhold's 
headquarters group. The three Dragoon Guards 
tanks came next, followed by the Wasp sections 
and Lieutenant James MacDonald's 14 Platoon. 
The self-propelled anti-tank guns of 94th Battery 
brought up the rear. The smoke screen intended 
to shield Winhold's men from the right and left 
would last only five minutes after H-Hour in front 
of Bienen so the company would have to move 
fast. 
Once the battlegroup moved out from the 
cover of the Argyll Farm it was clear that the 
mortar smoke and medium machine gun 
suppression on Androp was working well, but 
the artillery smoke on Bienen was dissipating 
too quickly. As the "C" Company force stretched 
out across the field, machine guns in Bienen 
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opened fire. Winhold ordered everyone to make 
a run for the objective while he called for more 
mortar smoke. Men began to fall, but the 
company pressed on knowing that to stop 
without any cover would be suicide. 
In response Captain Webber's mortar crews 
poured 200 smoke bombs onto Bienen in four 
minutes, creating what Webber later called "a 
beautiful screen." Winhold then climbed aboard 
the 4/7th troop leader's tank and directed them 
to traverse their turrets left and blast Bienen 
with all their weapons. In the rear of the column 
Sergeant George Stewart took over 14 Platoon 
after fellow Prince Edward Islander James 
MacDonald was brought down. From his 
position Stewart could see several machine guns 
firing on the head of the column. He ran towards 
the enemy ordering a section to follow. After 
siting the section in a protected fire position from 
which it could take on the German MGs, Stewart 
ran back through a hail of bullets to rejoin his 
platoon. 
Under this covering fire, Bill Myers and his 
men raced for the Speldrop-Bienen road. By the 
time the platoon crossed the road to assault the 
house on the other side, only eight men were 
left. As they rushed across a German officer 
stepped out of the house and shot Myers before 
he too was cut down. Myers' determination and 
unfailing encouragement to his men earned him 
the Military Cross, but the German bullet 
paralyzed him for life. 
Platoon Sergeant J. Propokchuk, shot 
through both legs, dragged himself across the 
road using his rifle as a crutch to aid his 
wounded platoon leader and to urge the men on 
to finish the job. Private H.P. Christie took over 
the remaining seven men as they stormed the 
house. His body was found with his hand on the 
barrel of an MG 42. Three other Canadians lay 
dead behind him. 
Roper's 13 Platoon followed the seven into 
the houses around the northeast corner clearing 
out n u m e r o u s mach ine gun pos t s and 
consolidating the hard won gains of Myers's men. 
In the northwest corner, the remaining two 
sections in Sergeant Stewart's Platoon waded 
into a German trench system in and around the 
cemetery. "C" Company routed out some 100 
prisoners as they consolidated their hold on the 
crossroads. 
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Two surviving Duplex Drive Sherman tanks pass the third of their troop "brewed-up" by a mine south of Speldrop, 24 
March 1945. The Essex Yeomanry, equipped with DD Shermans, supported Scottish and Canadian units during the 
intial stages of Operation Plunder. Also note the flat, exposed terrain easily dominated by reinforced, multi-story houses. 
At 1445 hours, a scant 15 minutes after 
starting its 500-yard dash, "C" Company was in 
Bienen at a cost of eight dead and 24 wounded.40 
Five minutes later Lieutenant-Colonel Forbes 
learned "D" Company was also in, with 18 dead 
and 23 wounded, including Major Dickson. This 
ratio of dead to wounded would certainly have 
been worse were it not for stretcher-bearers 
Gordon Scott and Daniel Shanks who repeatedly 
drove their jeep ambulances along the lethal 
dyke and through the field until they had 
recovered all the wounded. During those 20 
minutes the Wasp flame-throwing vehicles, 
suggested by the Official History to be a key to 
the success of the second attack , all broke down 
or were damaged by German fire and never 
engaged the enemy.41 
Not about to lose momentum again, Forbes 
ordered Captain Fairweather and Major 
Learment to take their reorganized companies 
into the cauldron to help root out diehard Nazis. 
"B" Company moved up on the left and began to 
clear houses on the road leading towards the 
dyke. The Essex Yeomanry DD Shermans 
accompanied them in close support, brewing up 
bui ld ings to the front and r ight while 
Fairweather's men worked their way house-by-
house towards the beleaguered "D" Company. 
This movement drew the at tent ion of 
Germans in the fortress house who shifted some 
of their fire off "D" Company and on to the new 
threat. Fairweather had the tanks fire into the 
upper stories while 10 Platoon burst in on the 
main floor with weapons blazing. Several 
Germans were cut down before those remaining 
on the ground floor surrendered, but the balance 
of the house's defenders began firing down 
through the floor at 10 Platoon. The Essex tanks 
and 12 Platoon closed up to the fortress house 
and laced the upper two stories with rifle, Bren, 
grenade and tank fire while 10 Platoon shot back 
through the floors. The vertical battle lasted 
several minutes with men yelling frantically as 
they emptied magazines through the walls and 
floor and hurled grenades through windows and 
up stairwells. According to the North Nova 
regimental history, the German defenders cried 
"uncle" to indicate that they had had enough. 
The riflemen of 10 Platoon crept carefully 
up the stairs on the alert for German suicide 
attacks. In the upper stories they found 50 dead 
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The Bienen Tablet 
On 19 November 2000, the day which m a r k s Volkstrauertag (the German equivllent of Remembrance Day), a bronze tablet was unveiled at Bienen, Germany, in a widely a t t ended public ceremony. The 
plaque is moun ted on a s tone wall bordering the attractive cour tyard of the Roman Catholic Church of St. 
Cosmas and Damien whose origins at the same location in the centre of town, date back some eleven 
centur ies . 
The inscription on the plaque is in German, t rans la ted from the original English draft which reads as 
follows: 
THIS TABLET HAS BEEN PLACED BY A 
GROUP OF SURVIVING CANADIAN 
VETERANS OF THE NORTH NOVA SCOTIA 
HIGHLANDERS, 3 CANADIAN INFANTRY 
DIVISION, IN PROUD AND GRATEFUL 
MEMORY OF THOSE FORTY MEMBERS OF 
THEIR REGIMENT WHO FELL IN BATTLE 
AT BIENEN, GERMANY ON SUNDAY, MARCH 
25,1945 AND IN MEMORY OF THOSE 
FELLOW COMBATANTS OF 9 CANADIAN 
INFANTRY (HIGHLAND) BRIGADE AND 51 
BRITISH HIGHLAND DIVISION WHO DIED 
IN THE SAME BATTLE AND IN THE SAME 
CAUSE AND, AS WELL, IN RESPECTFUL 
MEMORY OF THOSE ADVERSARIES IN THE 
GERMAN ARMY WHO DIED ON THAT SAME 
FATEFUL DAY. 
AT THE GOING DOWN OF THE SUN, 
AND IN THE MORNING 
WE WILL REMEMBER THEM. 
ERRECTED AT BIENEN ON THE 55TH 
ANNIVERSARY OF THE EVENT, IN THE 
YEAR 2000. 
The late Don Forbes, who landed as second- in-command of the North Novas in Normandy on D-Day and 
who commanded the bat ta l ion from Ju ly of 1944 to the end of the war, h a d in an article publ ished in the 
summer of 1945 described Bienen as "probably the most important operation performed by the Battalion and 
as one whose effect on the operations of XXX Corps was far-reaching." 
This project was l aunched by several North Nova Bienen veterans in November 1999. It was financed 
exclusively by small private subscr ip t ions . A brief exchange of correspondence shortly gained the approval, 
confidence, assis tance and suppor t of a local heritage group at Bienen and of the Burgemeister and Municipal 
Council of the City of Rees - with which Bienen has amalgamated. Within six months the plaque, after preparation 
In record t ime at a foundry in Lunenburg , NS, h a d been t aken to Europe by a de t achmen t of sailors from 
HMCS Montreal and had been presented to the Burgemeister at Rees. Actual p lacement and unveiling of the 
tablet was postponed to November to allow for restorat ion of the courtyard which was then underway and to 
accommodate other associated activities. 
The tablet is un ique in a n u m b e r of ways. Firstly, it was at 
the time of unveiling one of only a few - and possibly the only 
- memorial located within Germany mark ing the location of 
an engagement in tha t country by Allied land forces in the 
Second World War. Secondly, there are probably few, if any, 
memorials anywhere which, like this plaque, recognize the war-
dead of a wart ime adversary. We are now, almost 60 years 
later, the ally and friend of Germany and our soldiers now 
frequently find themselves serving beside those in he r forces 
in peacekeeping and other missions. And of course there is 
the c i rcumstance tha t located only a few h u n d r e d metres from 
the plaque-site lies a well-tended, and sizable, German military 
cemetery - whose graves also date from tha t Palm Sunday of 
1945. Thirdly - and pe rhaps most important ly - the plaque 
serves as a reminder tha t even now, many years after the event, 
those words "We will remember them" still carry meaning. 
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Germans and 40 more ready to surrender, many 
of whom were wounded.42 This full-strength 
company, with numerous MG 42s and an 
abundant supply of ammunition, was in essence 
the 'castle keep' guarding Bienen's inner line of 
defence. With the fall of the fortress house, 
organized and effective resistence collapsed. 
Fairweather was finally able to link up with 
"D" Company's survivors now led by CSM Harry 
Bishop after all their officers were wounded or 
evacuated for exhaustion. Bishop's steadfastness 
in holding the hard-won ground earned him the 
Military Medal. For the next several hours the 
North Novas consolidated, reorganized and drew 
ammunition. As far as they knew, it was still up 
to them to clear the rest of town. "D" Company, 
reduced to half its strength, combined with 
Fairweather's company which had suffered about 
25 per cent losses. "C" Company reorganized 
into two p la toons after losing 33 men. 
Learment's "A" Company formed up in two 
platoons behind "C" Company, after losing 25 
per cent of its strength. 
The fight for Bienen was not over yet. The 
North Novas could not afford the luxury of 
digging in and taking the tactical advantage until 
the Germans emerged from cover to 
counterattack. The guns behind Bienen still had 
to be silenced. The exhausted companies once 
again summoned their resolve and resumed the 
advance at 1700 hours. Winhold's two platoons 
worked their way north on the two right-hand 
streets with tanks and anti-tank guns in support. 
Fairweather's composite company moved up the 
left street. Participants report capturing shaken 
and surprised prisoners in almost every house 
they entered, many of them paratroopers from 
the original 16 Parachute Regiment garrison. 
The paratroopers may have been broken but 
it seemed that 115 Panzer Grenadier Regiment 
was still cohesive and not prepared to give up 
the Bienen bottleneck. Behaving true to form for 
the German army in a fluid tactical situation, 
they counterattacked. The move caught the 
weakened Canadians while they were still 
clearing houses. Leading the attack were three 
German assaul t guns which, apparent ly 
oblivious to how far into town the North Novas 
had penetrated, raced down the road past 
Winhold's right-hand platoon. Years of training 
in England, and ten mon ths of combat 
professionalized the Highlanders so they did not 
break when the enemy armour moved behind 
them. Winhold coolly stood his ground and 
radioed the tanks and anti-tank guns holding a 
firm shoulder with "A" Company at the 
crossroads short of the creamery. 
In the twilight, just past 1815 hours, the 
German armoured vehicles spotted the Dragoon 
Guards Shermans manoeuvring from positions 
covering the Emmerich road to meet the threat 
from the northeast. Each Sherman fired once at 
30 yards range, but their shots went high. The 
German guns opened up with armour piercing 
shells at point blank range lighting up two British 
tanks. The surviving Sherman and enemy 
assau l t guns scurr ied away in opposite 
directions. 
Shortly after the enemy armour clanked past 
"C" Company, German machine guns opened fire 
covering a rush forward by panzer-grenadiers. 
Winhold withdrew his strung out sections back 
to "A"Company's firm base where they prepared 
to destroy the counterattack. On the left, "B" 
Company's lead platoon was also caught in the 
open by the panzer-grenadier attack. Fairweather 
consolidated his men in a company stronghold 
at the fortress house. Once the battalion was firm 
in these positions, forward observation officers 
began bringing down artillery on the north end 
of town.43 
This gunfire and the presence of North Novas 
deep in Bienen disrupted the Germans long 
enough for "A" and "C" Companies to establish 
strong defences backed by mortars and anti-tank 
guns. The German grenadiers who survived the 
shellfire loomed out of the darkness around the 
creamery into a prepared Canadian killing zone. 
A 94th Battery 17-pounder destroyed one of the 
German assault guns while Sergeant Stewart 
again distinguished himself by skilfully directing 
13 Platoon's rifle and Bren fire onto the 
accompanying grenadiers. This action together 
with his earlier exploits won him the Military 
Medal. 
As if to validate Anglo-Canadian doctrine, 
the North Novas defeated the counterattack, 
"terminated" more German men and machines, 
and broke 115 Panzer Grenadier Regiment's 
cohesion, all without any further cost in 
Canadian lives. Nevertheless, by this point in 
the day the battalion was physically and mentally 
exhausted. Thankfully, the Highland Light 
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Infantry, somewhat rested after their ordeal the 
night before, were on their way up to relieve the 
weary Nova Scotians. 
As soon as the relief occurred at 2300 hours, 
the effort to clear the bottleneck and get the 
German guns continued. The HLI were as 
cognizant as any of the importance of this task 
after coming under continual shell and mortar 
fire while "resting" and re-supplying that 
afternoon in Esserden. Just as they had done in 
Speldrop, Lieutenant-Colonel Strickland's men 
worked their way forward with grenades and 
bayonets. 
In the two weeks prior to Plunder the entire 
brigade underwent refresher training in village 
and wood-clearing drills. This training paid off 
because every house in Bienen was a mini-
fortress complete with abundant machine guns. 
Each had to be cleared with deliberate section 
or platoon assaults. The Ontario men also 
endured more suicide attacks by determined 
Nazis, and a steady stream of enemy mortar and 
shellfire. The Canadians in the Bienen bottleneck 
still did not have priority for the XXX Corps 
counter-battery medium guns. In spite of these 
challenges, the men of the HLI gained a firm hold 
on Bienen by dawn, with the exception of the 
odd sniper. By mid-morning they had pressed 
400 yards north, past German heavy mortar 
posi t ions, to the an t i - tank ditch on the 
Emmerich road. During their second night-long 
battle in a row, four more died, and 28 were 
wounded.44 
That same night 51st Highland Division 
p u n c h e d its way th rough the s o u t h e r n 
bottleneck, defeated 104 Panzer-Grenadier 
Regiment and shot up much of 116th Panzer 
Division. When the sun came up, so did fresh 
resources from 43rd Wessex and 3rd Canadian 
Divisions. On 26 March, with the situation 
around Rees under control, General Horrocks 
at last shifted artillery priority to the northern 
bottleneck. 
The North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment 
benefited greatly from that re-prioritization. 
When they attacked Millingen, they had the 
support of a full squadron of 4/7th Dragoon 
Guards tanks, seven field and two medium 
regiments of artillery, as well as Typhoon fighter-
bombers. When the North Shores entered 
Millingen at 1700 h o u r s , p e r h a p s not 
surprisingly, they reported light resistence, 
although they received the surrender of many 
dazed Germans. The only fatal casualty was their 
much loved Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-
Colonel J.W.H. Rowley. He was killed by a mortar 
bomb while standing on the deck of a 4 / 7th 
Sherman urging the tankers to form up away 
from his men so as not to draw fire upon them 
as they awaited H-Hour. 
This attack marked the turning point in the 
battle and, in an operational sense, 3rd 
Division's war. Schlemm's First Parachute Army 
was broken. Second British Army began its 
march east while First Canadian Army embarked 
on its historic liberation of the Netherlands. The 
four American armies now in Europe stole the 
show with their sensational race to the Elbe 
River. In a few weeks the war would be over and 
the survivors would prepare to return home. 
Many surviving North Nova Scotia 
Highlanders left Bienen with physical wounds 
and a great many more with deep scars of the 
mind. Next to the fighting on 7 J u n e in 
Normandy, Bienen stands out as the battalion's 
most difficult and bloody battle of the war. The 
cost was made more bitter when veterans read 
the official history which implied the North 
Novas were incapable of carrying out their 
mission. 
For survivors of Dave Dickson's company, 
memories are especially painful. "C" Company's 
charge at Bienen, which earned Lloyd Winhold 
a Distinguished Service Order, is now North 
Nova legend, while "D" Company's attack is 
remembered as less than successful. However, 
after considering all available evidence, including 
terrain, it is clear that "D" Company's sacrifice 
drew the bulk of German defensive fire and 
enabled "C" Company to break into town on the 
right. "D" Company also drew the attention of 
the fortress house as "B" Company closed in to 
finish it off. 
To defeat the superior enemy force in Bienen 
the North Nova Scot ians used fire and 
manoeuvre tactics supported mainly by their 
own battalion heavy weapons. The only way to 
succeed in such circumstances was to play on 
the German defensive principle of concentrating 
fire against the decisive threat. The North Novas 
26 
22
Canadian Military History, Vol. 12 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol12/iss2/2
in effect created two decisive threats at Bienen 
hoping both would succeed, but appreciating 
that one would likely draw death upon itself so 
the other could succeed. This tac t ica l 
phenomenon does not seem unique in the 
Canadian experience in the Second World War. 
From the fighting in Sicily and Italy, through 
Normandy, the Scheldt, and in Bienen, the 
Canadian Army often found itself conducting 
"economy of force" missions enabling British or 
American formations to achieve the great 
victories remembered by history. 
Regrettably history records that after a day-
long battle, the North Nova Scotia Highlanders 
were unable to clear Bienen and push past it in 
accordance with their "real-estate" oriented 
orders. C.P. Stacey's implication in the Canadian 
official history is that once again, fundamental 
problems in the way the Canadian Army did 
bus iness prevented it from at ta ining its 
geographic objective and making the Rhine 
bridging sites safe. 
This conclusion misses the heart of the 
matter. In the end, the North Novas broke the 
German defenders of Bienen, capturing 200 of 
them and killing even more. The real issue is 
that the North Novas, with the rest of 9 Brigade, 
fought and won a battle of annihilation against 
a larger German force. This was the unstated, 
but eminently clear, primary mission. In doing 
so they created a threat to the German line 
sufficient to draw the bulk of their artillery and 
mortar attention away from the crossing sites 
and onto 9 Brigade, thereby accomplishing their 
other task of easing pressure on engineers 
working at the river bank. 
History's misinterpretation of events in and 
around Bienen calls into question the common 
assumption that "professional" German soldiers 
were better motivated and thus more willing to 
take aggressive tactical action than their Anglo-
Canadian "citizen-soldier" opponents. The 
determination demonstrated by 9 Canadian 
Infantry Brigade on 24 and 25 March 1945 
demands that historians take a second look at 
what the "citizen-soldiers"of 1939 had become 
when they came to grips with the best the 
German Army had to offer in 1944-45. 
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Lee W i n d s o r i s a d o c t o r a l c a n d i d a t e a t t h e 
Un ive r s i ty of New B r u n s w i c k in F r e d e r i c t o n 
a n d a f o r m e r m e m b e r of t h e VIII ( P r i n c e s s 
Lou i se ' s ) C a n a d i a n H u s s a r s a n d t h e Wes t 
Nova S c o t i a R e g i m e n t . 
CMH Mailbox 
continued from page 4. 
p a r t i c u l a r l y for h igh i n t e n s i t y 
operations. Interestingly as brigade 
c o m m a n d e r , Ki tchlng received 
exposure , albeit briefly, to the 
p r o b l e m s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n 
breakdowns, obscure information 
and employing unseasoned troops 
against an experienced opponent 
making effective use of the ground. 
One must still ask, how well did the 
Canadian Army prepare not only its 
troops, bu t its senior commanders 
for the demands of combat? For 
e x a m p l e , t h e 4 t h C a n a d i a n 
Armoured Division had b u t two 
divisional level exercises before its 
vehicles were quarant ined. While 
we can delve Into socio-historical 
analyses, I fear we are no closer to 
unders tanding this subject to the 
level we should. 
This digression complete, the 
point of this letter Is to address the 
p o r t r a y a l o f t h e 1s t P o l i s h 
Armoured Division. 
The au thor s ta tes on page 18, 
tha t "not only did they [the 4 th 
Canadian Armoured Division] have 
to deal with Germans a t tacking 
from all sides and t h o u s a n d s of 
surrender ing Germans , they also 
had to rescue the Poles." Really? 
Told to close the gap "as quickly 
a s p o s s i b l e , " b o t h a r m o u r e d 
divisions in First Canadian Army 
set off immediately. Spearheading 
the Canadian advance, the Poles 
r e a c h e d C h a m b o i s l a te on 19 
August , becoming involved in a 
fierce battle with Germans trying to 
get out of the pocket, which stopped 
the i r l ink ing up wi th t h e lead 
e l e m e n t s of t h e 4 t h C a n a d i a n 
Armoured Division at Molssy. The 
battlefield was, as one might say 
t o d a y , n o n - c o n t i g u o u s , a n d 
Maczek's troops were attacked from 
all sides. According to Stacey: 
Cut off from the rest of First 
Canadian Army; unable to 
evacuate their prisoners and their 
own wounded, and running short 
of ammunition, petrol and food; 
and fighting desperately against 
Germans attacking both from 
inside and outside the pocket, the 
Poles had a hard and bitter day 
on the 20th. 
Unce r t a in ty m a r k e d the ent i re 
battle. As Donald E. Graves pointed 
ou t in h i s s t u d y of The S o u t h 
Alberta Regiment, uni t war diaries 
from the period regular ly u s e d 
words like "confusion," "obscure" 
a n d " u n c e r t a i n . " This w a s t h e 
reality of battle In August 1944 and 
b rought a n u m b e r of problems, 
such as attacks on friendly units by 
Allied bombers and tactical fighters. 
One aerial attack destroyed half the 
petrol earmarked for the 2nd Polish 
A r m o u r e d R e g i m e n t (Is t h a t 
i n c o m p e t e n c e ? ) ; r u b b l e a n d 
dest ruct ion also hampered their 
progress . During the batt le, the 
Polish a rmoured division suffered 
considerable casualties; combined 
wi th ear l ier los ses , u n i t s were 
under strength, many leaders gone 
and performance affected, similar 
to the si tuat ion in 4 th Canadian 
A r m o u r e d Divis ion. Given t h e 
Polish situation, replacements were 
limited and many of those diverted 
to the 2nd Polish Corps In Italy. 
The author's apology that casualties 
continued on page 50... 
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